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 Imperfect Enforcement of Emissions Trading and Industry Welfare: A Laboratory 
Investigation 
 
Abstract: This paper uses laboratory experiments to investigate the performance of emission 
permit markets when compliance is imperfectly enforced. In particular we examine deviations in 
observed aggregate payoffs and expected penalties from those derived from a model of risk-
neutral payoff-maximizing firms. We find that the experimental emissions markets were 
reasonably efficient at allocating individual emission control choices despite imperfect 
enforcement and significant noncompliance. However, violations and expected penalties were 
lower than predicted when these are predicted to be high, but were about the same as predicted 
values when these values were predicted to be low.  Thus, although a standard model of 
compliance with emissions trading programs tends to predict significantly higher violations than 
we observe when subjects have strong incentives to violate their emissions permits, individual 
emissions control responsibilities are distributed among firms as predicted. 
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1. Introduction 
Much of what we understand about the advantages of emissions trading programs, particularly 
vis-à-vis traditional command and control approaches, is based on models of full compliance 
with these policies. However, emissions trading policies are not likely to perform as expected if 
these programs are not enforced well. Recognizing this concern, there is now a significant body 
of theoretical literature on the consequences of imperfect enforcement of emissions trading 
programs (e.g. Keeler 1991, Malik 1990 and 1992, Stranlund and Dhanda 1999, Stranlund 2007).  
  While the theory of the compliance and enforcement problem in emissions trading has 
advanced quite far, there are few empirical investigations of compliance behavior and the 
performance of emissions markets under imperfect compliance. The dearth of empirical research 
in this area is due to the fact that opportunities for empirical analyses of imperfect enforcement 
  1in existing trading programs are limited.
1 In situations in which naturally occurring data are 
limited, laboratory experiments are particularly valuable. In fact, several recent papers use 
experiments to examine various aspects of imperfect compliance in emission trading programs 
(Cason and Gangadharan 2006, Murphy and Stranlund 2006 and 2007). These works provide 
valuable results about the compliance behavior of subjects in experimental emissions permit 
markets, but none deal directly with the effects of noncompliance on the social costs and benefits 
of these programs.
2 In this study, we use the data from a series of emissions trading experiments 
to examine the impacts of imperfect enforcement on industry welfare. By imperfect enforcement 
we mean that enforcement efforts—monitoring and penalties—are not sufficient to induce full 
compliance by all firms. 
  The main value of competitive emissions permit markets is that they will produce the 
allocation of emissions control among firms that maximizes industry profit, given the reduction 
of aggregate emissions. Malik (1990) demonstrates that this result holds under reasonable 
circumstances even when enforcement cannot induce full compliance. Moreover, he shows that 
this result is independent of firms’ risk preferences. Since permit markets are predicted to 
distribute control responsibilities efficiently, the main conceptual effect of imperfect 
enforcement is that individual firms will violate their permits and therefore aggregate emissions 
will exceed the number of permits that are put into circulation.  When this occurs, it is easy to 
demonstrate that trading will distribute permits such that the individual violation choices of risk-
                                                 
1 For example, the EPA’s SO2 Allowance Trading Program and the NOX Budget Program have achieved such high 
rates of compliance that there is simply not enough variation to conduct meaningful econometric analyses of 
compliance decisions in these programs. See the most recent compliance reports for these programs, U.S. EPA 
(2007a and 2007b). 
2 Although experimental techniques have been used to evaluate other policy initiatives, including some aspects of 
emissions trading programs (see the review by Muller and Mestelman 1998 and papers in the book edited by Isaac 
and Holt 1999), these techniques have not yet been widely applied to issues of regulatory enforcement. By far, the 
bulk of experimental analyses of compliance and enforcement is in the area of income tax compliance. See Alm and 
McKee (1998) and Torgler (2002) for comprehensive surveys of this literature. 
  2neutral firms will minimize aggregate expected penalties for the given level of emissions. Since 
the distribution of individual emissions maximizes gross profit (penalties excluded) and the 
distribution of individual violations minimizes expected penalties, a competitive emission 
trading program that is imperfectly enforced will maximize aggregate expected net profits 
(aggregate gross profits minus aggregate expected penalties), given the level of aggregate 
emissions that is achieved.   
Our laboratory experiments were designed to investigate whether and how aggregate 
gross profit, aggregate expected penalties, and aggregate expected net profits deviate from 
theoretical predictions that are based on risk-neutral profit-maximizing firms when enforcement 
is not expected to induce their full compliance.  Empirically, deviations from predictions about 
industry welfare can be decomposed into two types of effects. The first are individual allocation 
effects that account for deviations in aggregate profits and expected penalties from model 
predictions, given the observed levels of aggregate emissions and aggregate violations. Isolating 
these effects allows us to examine whether the market allocates individual emissions control 
responsibilities among firms so as to maximize aggregate gross profit and allocates violations to 
minimize aggregate expected penalties, even if observed aggregate emissions and violations 
differ from predicted values. It is important to note that if the distribution of individual violations 
does not maximize aggregate gross profits, then we will reject Malik’s assertion that emission 
markets will distribute individual control responsibilities efficiently even when these markets are 
imperfectly enforced. However, we cannot say that a permit market fails if we find that 
individual violation choices do not minimize aggregate expected penalties. Deviations in 
individual violations from predicted values that lead to higher expected penalties can be due to 
differences in risk preferences (or other compliance-related preferences) that are assumed away 
  3by the model of risk-neutral profit-maximizing behavior. The second part of deviations in gross 
profits and expected penalties from predictions are aggregate compliance effects that can arise if 
aggregate emissions and violations differ from predicted values. A difference between observed 
and predicted aggregate emissions and violations also do not imply a permit market failure 
because they can also stem from a failure of a standard model of firms to accurately predict 
compliance choices.  
  The deviations in aggregate gross profits, expected penalties, and expected net profits 
from model predictions, and our decompositions of these deviations into allocation and 
compliance effects, yield several results. One of the most important is that the experimental 
markets tended to allocate individual emissions control so that aggregate gross profits were very 
close to maximized values, given the observed levels of aggregate emissions. Thus, we find 
strong support for Malik’s hypothesis that emissions markets will distribute individual abatement 
efforts efficiently despite imperfect enforcement and significant noncompliance.  
  However, aggregate violations were significantly lower than predicted when predicted 
violations were very high, while the subjects’ violations were quite close to predicted values 
when predicted violations were lower. In all cases, individual violation choices did not minimize 
aggregate expected penalties at the observed levels of aggregate violations. However, because 
the subjects did not violate their permits as much as predicted when their violations were 
predicted to be high, aggregate expected penalties were significantly lower than predicted in 
these treatments. In the treatments in which predicted violations were lower, aggregate expected 
penalties were usually not statistically different from predicted values.   
  These results point to a failure of the model of risk-neutral profit-maximizing behavior to 
accurately predict compliance behavior when the subjects had very strong incentives to violate 
  4their permits. Despite this our observations of aggregate expected net profits—gross profits 
minus expected penalties—were often not very far away from our predictions. Observed 
aggregate expected net profits were at least 96% of their maximums for the treatments in which 
we predicted low violations, and between 87% and 96% of maximums for the treatments for 
which predicted violations were high.   
  With imperfectly enforced emissions trading programs the two most important items to 
be concerned about are the aggregate level of emissions control and the distribution of individual 
emissions control. Our results suggest that emissions trading is a reasonably efficient way to 
allocate individual emissions control responsibilities, even when enforcement is imperfect. 
Moreover, poorly enforced programs may not result in as much noncompliance as a standard 
model would predict. Depending on the benefits of pollution control in a particular setting, it is 
easy to imagine how lower-than-predicted violations and emissions could result in higher-than-
predicted social welfare if the additional benefit of pollution control outweighs the reduction in 
the expected net profits of pollution sources. This, of course, is not a justification for designing 
poorly enforced trading programs. Our analysis merely suggests that imperfect enforcement may 
not always be as costly as standard models predict.  
 
2. Firm behavior and market equilibrium under imperfectly enforced emission trading  
In this section we present a standard model of firm behavior and the equilibrium of an 
imperfectly enforced emissions trading policy that provides the foundation for our experimental 
design. Because all of the results in this section can be gleaned from the existing literature (in 
particular, Malik 1992, Stranlund and Dhanda 1999, and Stranlund 2007), we only sketch the 
theory. 
  5  Consider a fixed set of heterogeneous risk neutral firms.  Firm i’s gross profit from 
emitting qi is given by the strictly concave gross profit function  . ( ) ii bq
3 Absent a regulatory 
motivation to reduce its emissions, the firm emits  i q , the solution to  ( ) 0 ii bq ′ = . A market for 
emission permits will generate a permit price that motivates the firm to emit  i qq < i . For these 
levels of emissions,  .   ( ) 0 ii bq ′ >
  A total of  i L <∑q  emissions permits are distributed to the firms free of charge. Firm i’s 
initial allocation is  , and it chooses to hold l
0
i l i permits after trading is completed. Each permit 
confers the legal right to emit one unit. Assume competitive behavior in the permit market so 
that all trades take place at a constant price p. The analysis throughout is static. 
  If a firm is noncompliant, then its emissions exceed the number of permits it holds and 
the magnitude of its violation is  .  If the firm is compliant,   and v 0 ii i vql =− > 0 ii ql −≤ i = 0. To 
check for compliance, each firm is audited with a known and fixed probability π. A firm that is 
found to be in violation is penalized according to a penalty function, ( ) i f v , which is increasing 
and strictly convex for  .  The audit probability and the penalty function are exogenous and 
do not vary across firms.  
0 i v ≥
  Assuming throughout that each firm chooses positive emissions and holds a positive 
number of permits, firm i’s objective is:  
        [1] 
0
, max ( ) ( ) ( )
subject to  0.
ii
i i ii ii ql
ii
bq p l l fq l
ql
π −− − −
−≥
                                                 
3 Strictly speaking,   is the firm’s gross profit assuming that it makes all of its input and output choices 
optimally. See Montgomery (1972) for a demonstration of the concavity of profit in emissions for firms that are 
price-takers in input and output markets. Many authors choose to model firms’ abatement costs rather than profits 
from emissions. We presented our subjects with profit functions so we use them here to maintain consistency. There 
is no loss of generality in our approach. 
() ii bq
  6Restricting the firm to   follows from the fact that a firm will never have an 
incentive to be over-compliant.  Letting   denote the Lagrange equation for [1] and 
0 ii i vq l =− ≥
L i λ  denote 
the multiplier attached to the constraint  0 ii ql − ≥ , the first-order conditions for a solution to [1] 
are: 
   () ( ) 0 ; qi i i i i bq f q l π λ ′′ =− − + = L       [ 2 ]  
() 0 li i pf q l ;   i π λ ′ =− + − − = L       [ 3 ]  
   0,  0,  ( ) 0. i iii i i ql ql λ λ λ =− ≥ ≥ −= L       [ 4 ]  
Because the constraint   is linear and the firm’s objective is strictly concave these 
conditions are necessary and sufficient to identify unique optimal choices of emissions, permit 
demand, and violation level. 
0 ii ql −≥
  As noted in the introduction, Malik (1990) demonstrated an interesting and important 
result concerning the performance of emission trading programs and imperfect enforcement. 
Under reasonable specifications of the probability of monitoring firms, which include random 
monitoring as in this paper, a competitive permit market will distribute individual emissions 
control responsibilities so that, regardless of the level of aggregate abatement actually achieved, 
aggregate abatement costs are minimized.  Moreover, Malik showed that this result does not 
depend on the firms’ risk preferences. Malik’s result is fully equivalent to saying that aggregate 
gross profit will be maximized given the actual level of aggregate emissions despite imperfect 
enforcement and significant noncompliance.  
To demonstrate this, combine equations [2] and [3] to obtain ( ) ii p bq ′ = , which is the 
familiar rule that competitive firms will choose their emissions to equate the going permit price 
to their marginal benefits of increased emissions. Equating marginal gross profits across firms 
  7gives us the necessary conditions for maximizing industry gross profit given some level of 
aggregate emissions. Therefore, letting Q denote aggregate emissions, in a permit market 
equilibrium we have:  
   () , p BQ ′ =  where
11




ii q B Qb qq
==
Q = = ∑∑    [5] 
  Note that a firm’s emissions choice is independent of the enforcement strategy it faces, 
and thus holds regardless of its compliance choice. Therefore, the ability of the permit market to 
allocate individual emissions choices efficiently is not affected by the enforcement strategy that 
is applied to the market or the risk preferences of firms.  Testing this conclusion is one of the 
primary motivations for our experiments.   
  Because competitive trading of a limited supply of permits is expected to distribute 
individual emissions choices efficiently despite imperfect enforcement, the main theoretical 
consequence of imperfect enforcement is that aggregate emissions will exceed the aggregate 
supply of emissions permits. Toward characterizing the equilibrium violations of noncompliant 
risk neutral firms, [3] indicates that a noncompliant firm chooses its violation to satisfy 
() i p fv π ′ = . Note that a firm’s violations depend on the permit price and the enforcement 
strategy all firms face, but it does not depend on anything that is unique about the firm.
4 Since 
the determinants of the firms’ violation choices are the same, if they are all noncompliant they all 
choose the same level of violation. What drives this result is the ability of a permit market to 
                                                 
4 For this reason, Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) argued that a budget-constrained regulator that seeks to minimize the 
aggregate violations of heterogeneous risk neutral firms cannot use differences in the firms’ control costs or initial 
permit allocations to target its monitoring effort. The reason is that each firm’s emissions and violation decisions are 
keyed to the permit price so that, at the margin, there are no differences among them that an enforcer can exploit. 
Murphy and Stranlund (2007) use laboratory experiments to test and confirm the hypothesis that firms’ violations 
choices are independent of their abatement costs. They do find, however, some evidence that violations may depend 
in part on whether firms are net buyers or net sellers of permits. 
  8equate the marginal incentives of risk-neutral firms to release emissions and to violate their 
permits.  
  Just like equating the firms’ marginal incentives to pollute maximizes aggregate gross 
profit given aggregate emissions, equating the marginal violation incentives of risk neutral firms 
minimizes aggregate expected penalties given aggregate emissions. Given Q, and a supply of 
permits L, aggregate violations are VQL = − . Obviously we must have   It is 
straightforward to show that in a permit equilibrium,  
0. V ≥
    where  () , pP V ′ =
11




ii v PV f v v V π
==
= = ∑∑    [6] 
That is, P(V) is minimum aggregate expected penalties for aggregate violations V, and in 
equilibrium the permit price is equal to the marginal of this function.   
Having characterized the emissions and violation choices of risk neutral firms in a 
competitive emissions trading program, as well as their aggregate gross profits and expected 
penalties, let us now turn to the market equilibrium of such a program. Since the focus of this 
paper is on the industry-level welfare consequences of imperfect enforcement and compliance, 
we determine an equilibrium permit price and aggregate emissions, given an initial distribution 
of L emissions permits and an enforcement strategy that cannot produce perfect compliance. Our 
results in [5] and [6] reveal a three-way equality that uniquely identifies the equilibrium permit 
price and aggregate emissions:       
    ( ) ( ) . p BQ PQ L ′′ == −       [ 7 ]  
  The equilibrium comparative statics of this problem are easy to demonstrate (see 
Stranlund and Dhanda 1999). Aggregate emissions and violations are increasing as enforcement 
is weakened, either by reducing the monitoring probability or reducing the marginal penalty 
function. Because weaker enforcement decreases the aggregate demand for permits, the 
  9equilibrium permit price falls. Increasing the supply of permits decreases the equilibrium permit 
price and increases aggregate emissions, but aggregate violations fall. 
  In this paper, however, we focus on the deviations of behavior in the lab from the 
predictions of the model described above. Moreover, since we are interested consequences of 
these deviations on industry-level payoffs, we will focus on the aggregates that our experimental 
markets produce— aggregate emissions, aggregate violations, aggregate gross profits, aggregate 
expected penalties, and aggregate expected net profits. Denote our actual observations of these 
values as  ,  , 
a Q
a V
a B ,  , and  , respectively. Given our experimental design, the theory 
described above for risk-neutral profit-maximizing firms provides predictions for aggregate 
emissions and violations,   and  .  Moreover, the theory predicts that the distribution of 
individual emissions will maximize aggregate gross profits, and the distribution of individual 







p B Q  defined by [5], and our prediction of aggregate expected penalties is   
defined by [6]. Finally, it is easy to demonstrate that the predictions of individual emissions and 
violations maximizes aggregate expected net profits, . (We write 
expected net profits as a function of aggregate emissions alone because these automatically 
determine aggregate violations given the supply of permits). 
( )
p PV
( ) ( ) ( )
pp WQ BQ PV =−
p
  Empirically, observed deviations from model predictions can be decomposed into two 
effects: individual allocation effects and aggregate compliance effects. Individual allocation 
effects occur when individual emission and violation choices deviate from model predictions 
given the observed level of aggregate emissions and violations. Aggregate compliance effects 
arise whenever the observed level of aggregate emissions, and hence aggregate violations, 
deviate from the predictions.  
  10  This decomposition of the deviations in observed and predicted aggregate gross profits is 
   .    [8] 
Allocation Effect Compliance Effect
() ()  () ()
ap aa a p B BQ B BQ BQ BQ ⎡⎤ ⎡ −= − + − ⎣⎦ ⎣  	  
   	   

⎤ ⎦
The individual allocation effect in [8] is the difference between observed and maximum 
aggregate gross profits, conditioned on the observed level of aggregate emissions. Recall that 
Malik (1992) showed that a competitive emissions permit market should allocate individual 
emissions to maximize aggregate gross profit at the observed level of aggregate emissions, 
regardless of firms’ preferences for risk. By definition, the allocation effect in [8] must be non-
positive, and if it is negative then the permit market has failed to distribute individual emissions 
efficiently. 
  Note that the aggregate compliance effect of deviations from predicted aggregate gross 
profits in [8] is conditioned on the assumption that the permit market distributes individual 
emissions efficiently. This term can be any sign depending on whether observed aggregate 
emissions ( ) are greater than, less than, or equal to the theoretically predicted level,  . Note 




a B Q  and  ( )
p B Q do not indicate market failures because deviations of 
from   could be due to differences in compliance incentives from those of risk-neutral 




a B Q  and  ( )
p B Q differ, the failure is because the model 
failed to predict aggregate emissions correctly.  
  In the same way we can decompose the deviation between observed and predicted 
expected aggregate penalties: 
   .    [9] 
Allocation Effect Compliance Effect
() ()  () ()
ap aa a p P PV P PV PV PV ⎡⎤ ⎡ −= − + − ⎣⎦ ⎣  	  
   	  

⎤ ⎦
  11The allocation effect in this case is the difference between observed and minimum expected 
aggregate penalties, conditioned on observed aggregate violations. This term is non-negative, 
because  is minimum aggregate expected penalties given observed aggregate emissions 
, and hence, observed aggregate violations  .  Again, deviations in observed and predicted 
expected penalties are not market failures. They indicate instead a failure of the model of risk-
neutral profit-maximizing firms to correctly predict individual violations. The compliance effect 
is conditioned on the firms choosing violations that minimize aggregate expected penalties, but 





  Finally, the allocation and compliance effects of deviations in aggregate expected net 
profits is  
   .   [10] 
Allocation Effect Compliance Effect
() ()  () ()
apaa a W WQ W WQ WQ WQ ⎡⎤ ⎡ −= − + − ⎣⎦ ⎣  	  
    	 

p ⎤ ⎦
The allocation effect on expected net profit is simply the allocation effect on gross profits in [8] 
minus the allocation effect on expected penalties in [9]. The compliance effect in [10] is defined 
in the same way.  
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
3.1 Experiment design 
Our experiments were designed to compare laboratory behavior to the predictions generated 
from the theory just described, but the subjects were placed in a more neutral environment. To 
avoid introducing potential biases due to individual attitudes about the environment or emissions 
trading, we framed the experiments as a production decision in which permits conveyed a license 
to produce, rather than an emissions decision. We also avoided the term “profit”, choosing 
  12instead the more neutral term “benefit”.  (Throughout the paper, however, we use profits and 
emissions). We are mainly interested in whether aggregate gross profits, expected penalties and 
expected net profits differ from predicted values, and if so, the extent to which these deviations 
are due to the inability of a permit market to allocate individual emissions choices efficiently or 
to compliance choices by the subjects that differ from those of a profit-maximizing risk neutral 
individual.  <INSERT TABLE 1>.   
Table 1 summarizes the experimental design. During each period, subjects 
simultaneously chose to emit units of an unspecified pollutant and traded in a market for permits 
that conveyed the right to emit. In the nine Imperfect Enforcement treatments, subjects could 
emit as much as they wished (up to a capacity constraint) regardless of the number of permits, l, 
they owned.  However, at the end of the period, each individual was audited with a known, 
exogenous probability.  If an individual was audited and found to be non-compliant (i.e., total 
emissions exceeded permit holdings), then a penalty was applied. In the two Perfect Enforcement 
treatments, subjects were only able to trade in the permit market; emissions were automatically 
set equal to the final permit balance. Because there was no compliance choice in these two 
baseline treatments, there was, of course, no need for fines or audits.  
  Subjects received a gross profit from their choice of emissions, q, which was generated 
from a linear marginal gross profit function,  ( ) 18 bq q ′ = −θ . Each experiment had eight subjects 
divided evenly into two types; subjects were randomly assigned a type.  Subjects with a high 
marginal gross profit function ( 1 H θ = ) also had a greater emission capacity of 17 units.  Subjects 
with a low marginal gross profit function ( 2 L θ = ) could emit up to 8 units. Emissions were 
constrained to be a whole number.  
  13Limiting the total supply of permits imposed an aggregate emissions standard, L. We 
consider two aggregate standards.  In the experiments with a low aggregate standard ( 28 L L = ), 
denoted Low Standard, each of the four high marginal gross profit subjects was initially 
allocated   permits, and the four low marginal gross profit subjects were each given four 
permits. In the high aggregate standard experiments (
0 3 l =
56 H L = ), denoted High Standard, there 
were two different initial allocations of permits.  With the Uniform initial allocation, each of the 
eight subjects started with seven permits.  With the Non-uniform initial allocation, the high 
marginal gross profit subjects began with 
0 13 l =  permits, and the low marginal gross profit 
subjects had a single permit.  
The treatment variables were the probability of an audit and the marginal penalty 
function (which together define an enforcement strategy), the initial permit allocation, and the 
total supply of permits.  Each of the eleven treatments was repeated three times. In the Imperfect 
Enforcement treatments, each subject’s record was examined with a known probability π.  If a 
subject was found to be non-compliant, that is q > l, then she was assessed a penalty that was 
generated from a linearly increasing marginal penalty function,  ( ) ( ). f ql F ql φ ′ − =+ − By 
changing the parameters of the expected marginal penalty function,  ( ) [ ( )], f ql F ql π πφ ′ −= + −  
we developed three enforcement strategies, which we label Medium(πH), Medium(πL), and Low. 
In theory, all risk neutral subjects should choose to be noncompliant under each of these levels of 
enforcement. The treatments Medium(πH) and Medium(πL) involved the same expected marginal 
penalties, but Medium(πH) had a higher monitoring probability and a relatively low marginal 
penalty function (πH = 0.70, F = 6, φ = 1.43), whereas Medium(πL) had a lower monitoring 
probability and a higher marginal penalty function (πL = 0.35, F = 12, φ = 2.90). Our intention 
here was to examine whether the subjects reacted differently to monitoring and penalties.  The 
  14Low marginal expected penalty treatments had the weakest enforcement strategy with the low 
monitoring probability and a low marginal penalty function (πL = 0.35, F = 2, φ = 2.90).  
Enforcement parameter values were chosen, in part, so that the expected marginal penalty 
functions are parallel to each other—each has a slope of about one.   
 
3.2 Experiment procedures 
Participants were recruited from the student population at the University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst.  Subjects were paid $7 for agreeing to participate and showing up on time, and were 
then given an opportunity to earn additional money in the experiment.  These additional earnings 
ranged between $5.68 and $17.49, with a mean of $13.67 (σ = 1.46).  Earnings were paid in cash 
at the end of each experiment.  Each experiment lasted about 2 hours. 
  The experiments were run in a computer lab using software designed specifically for this 
research.  To familiarize subjects with the experiments, we ran a series of training experiments.  
In the first stage of the trainers, students read online instructions that included interactive 
questions to ensure that they understood the instructions before proceeding.  After everyone had 
completed the instructions and all questions were answered, the training experiment began.  
These practice rounds contained all the same features as the “real data” experiments with the 
exception that we used a different set of parameters.  The data from the trainers were discarded. 
We recruited participants from the pool of trained subjects for the real data sessions.   
  Subjects were allowed to participate in multiple sessions. A total of 176 subjects 
participated in 33 eight-person market experiments (11 treatments, three groups per treatment). 
Because subjects were allowed to participate in multiple sessions, the number of unique 
participants is less than the total required. Prior to the start of the real data experiments, subjects 
  15were given a summary of the experiment instructions.
5  The experimenter read these instructions 
aloud and answered any questions.  Each subject was given a calculator, a pencil and paper.  
Each experiment consisted of 12 identical rounds.  At the start of each period, the eight subjects 
were each given an initial allocation of permits and $10 in experimental cash.   
  A unique feature of our experiments is that the emission decisions and permit market 
trading were unbundled into two separate, but simultaneous, activities.  We did this to allow for 
the possibility that the emission levels and permit holdings could differ, thereby introducing a 
compliance decision.  During the period and concurrent with the production decision, subjects 
were able to alter their permit holdings by trading in a continuous double auction.  In the auction, 
individuals could submit bids to buy or asks to sell a single permit. The highest bid and lowest 
ask price were displayed on the screen.  A trade occurred whenever a buyer accepted the current 
ask or a seller accepted the current bid.  After each trade, the current bid and ask were cleared 
and the market opened for a new set of bids and asks.  The trading price history was displayed on 
the screen. 
  Each period lasted a total of five minutes.  The permit market was open for the entire 
period, but production had to be completed in the first four minutes.  The one-minute 
reconciliation period gave subjects a final opportunity to adjust their permit holdings.  After each 
period ended, random audits were conducted and penalties were assessed. All information 
relating to audit outcomes was private.   
 
                                                 
5  The complete instructions, along with a summary are available online at 
http://faculty.cbpp.uaa.alaska.edu/jmurphy/research.html. 
  164. Results 
In this section we analyze the data from our experiments to investigate the effects of imperfect 
enforcement on aggregate gross profits, expected penalties and expected net profits. We are 
particularly interested in how our observations of these values differ from the predictions of the 
theoretical model of section.  Our data is made up of 11 treatments (indexed by k), each of which 
was played by three groups (indexed by j) over 12 rounds (indexed by t). We are interested only 
in aggregate outcomes, not individual choices. The first two periods are omitted from the 
analysis to minimize the effects of learning, leaving 10 observations per group. (Omitting the 
first two rounds does not change any of our qualitative results).  Therefore, we have 330 group-
level observations (11 treatments, 3 groups per treatment, 10 rounds per group).  
 
4.2 The compliance and allocation effects of deviations from predicted gross profits 
We begin our analysis with the comparisons of aggregate emissions and violations (Table 2). For 
each treatment k, we compare the mean of observed aggregate emissions and violations 
(averaged over the 3 groups and 10 rounds of the treatment), denoted  and  ,  to the 
predictions,  and  ,  from the model of section 2. For the Imperfect Enforcement treatments, 
note that mean aggregate violations,  , follow the basic comparative static predictions of the 
model: violations tend to increase with weaker enforcement (given an aggregate standard, the 
Low enforcement strategy treatment has the most violations) and lower aggregate standard (given 






The last column of Table 2 presents the differences between mean and predicted 
aggregate violations. Since each treatment has a fixed supply of permits, this difference in 
aggregate violations is identical to the difference in aggregate emissions; that is, 
  17apa VV QQ −≡−
p
j t
.   To investigate the statistical significance of these differences we employ 





k j tk k k j tjk
k
VV X α βν
=
−= + + + ∑ ε
p
,      [ 1 2 ]  
where X is the set of dummy variables for eight of the nine imperfect compliance treatments, 
with Low Standard, Medium (πH) Enforcement as the omitted dummy variable.
6  For the Perfect 
Enforcement treatments, predicted and mean aggregate violations (and aggregate emissions) are 
zero by design and are therefore not included in the regression model.  
  The most important results from Table 2 will have impacts throughout the analysis: the 
differences between mean and predicted aggregate violations,  , are negative and 
statistically significant for the three Low Standard treatments, but are statistically 
indistinguishable from zero for the six High Standard treatments. This suggests that individual 
choose lower-than-predicted violations when they are predicted to choose high violations, but 
that there violations are close to predicted values when these predictions are low. Clearly, the 
standard theoretical model of compliance in emissions trading programs does not accurately 
predict aggregate violations when enforcement is very weak. <INSERT TABLE 2> 
a VV −
 
4.2 The compliance and allocation effects of deviations from predicted gross profits 
We now turn to analyzing aggregate gross profits using the results shown in Table 3. If the 
emissions permit market is perfectly competitive and all firms are profit maximizers, then for 
each treatment, the predicted aggregate gross profit is  ( )
p B Q  from [5]. That is,  ( )
p B Q  is 
                                                 
6 For each treatment k, Table 2 reports the results of a Wald 
2 χ test of the null hypothesis that  0 k α β += , or in 
the case of the omitted dummy variable, Low Standard, Medium (πH) Enforcement,  0 α = . 
  18maximum aggregate gross profit achievable given predicted aggregate emissions  .  For each 
treatment, the average (over groups and rounds) of observed aggregate gross profits is denoted 
p Q
a B .  In order to decompose the difference between observed and predicted aggregate gross 
profits into allocation and compliance effects, we calculated the maximum possible gross profit 
given the observations of aggregate emissions for each group, round, and treatment. In Table 3 
we report the means of these values for each treatment,  ( )
a B Q . <INSERT TABLE 3> 
The results in the  ( )
ap B BQ − column of Table 3 show that observed aggregate gross 
profits are essentially equal to predicted gross profits under the Perfect Enforcement treatments. 
This simply replicates the well-known result that standard double auctions with perfect 
compliance yield highly efficient outcomes. However, under the Imperfect Enforcement/Low 
Standard treatments, observed gross profits are significantly lower than predicted gross profits. 
Under the Imperfect Enforcement/High Standard treatments, the deviations of mean observed 
gross profits from predictions are not statistically different for all but two of six cases.  In 
percentage terms,  (
a )
p B BQ , observed gross profits are always more than 97% of predicted 
gross profits under the Imperfect Enforcement/High Standard, while they range from only 80% 
to 94% of predicted gross profits under the Imperfect Enforcement/Low Standard treatments. 
But recall that a deviation of observed gross profits from the predicted value does not 
necessarily indicate that the permit market fails to distribute individual emission control 
efficiently. Such a deviation could be due differences in observed and predicted aggregate 
emissions that come from differences between actual and risk-neutral profit maximizing 
compliance choices. To better explain the differences between observed and predicted gross 
profits, we decomposed these differences into the allocation and compliance effects in equation 
  19[8] for each group in each round and present the means of these values for each treatment in 
Table 3.  
  The allocation effects in Table 3 provide a direct test of Malik’s (1990) hypothesis that 
permit markets will allocate individual emissions efficiently despite imperfect enforcement. If 
this hypothesis were to hold, then all the allocation effects in Table 3 would be statistically 
indistinguishable from zero; clearly they are not. Note that the allocation effects are essentially 
zero in our Perfect Enforcement treatments. Thus, when we did not give the subjects the 
opportunity to violate their permits, they successfully allocated emissions among themselves to 
maximize aggregate gross profits. However, the allocation effects are statistically significant in 
all nine Imperfect Enforcement treatments. From a practical perspective, however, these effects 
are very small and not economically significant since mean observed aggregate gross profits, 
a B , are always at least 96% of the maximum possible value given the observed level of 
emissions, ( )
a B Q .  We therefore conclude that the permit markets allocated individual emissions 
choices efficiently, despite imperfect enforcement, significant noncompliance, and emissions and 
violation choices that sometimes differ from their predicted values. 
In light of the previous discussion about the differences between observed and predicted 
aggregate violations (the results in Table 2), the compliance effects in Table 3 are not surprising.   
By design, the individual compliance effect is exactly zero in our Perfect Enforcement 
treatments. For the Imperfect Enforcement treatments, the compliance effects are negative and 
significant only for the Low Standard treatments; these effects are statistically indistinguishable 
from zero in all of the High Standard treatments. These results are simply a translation into 
aggregate gross profits of the result that actual violations are significantly lower than predicted 
for the Low Standard treatments but are essentially zero in the High Standard treatments.  
  20The large compliance effects for the Imperfect Enforcement/Low Standard treatments is 
the reason that mean observed gross profits are significantly lower than predicted in these 
treatments. That is, the permit markets were reasonably efficient at allocating individual 
emissions, but the subjects chose significantly lower-than-predicted violations. Mean observed 
gross profits are very close to predicted values for the Imperfect Enforcement/High Standard 
treatments because the allocations effects are small and the compliance effects are 
indistinguishable from zero. Again, the markets were reasonably efficient, but in these treatments 
aggregate violations were essentially the same as predicted.   
 
4.3 The compliance and allocation effects of deviations from predicted expected penalties 
We now examine deviations in observed expected penalties from predicted values and 
decompose these deviations into allocation and compliance effects. The results are in Table 4. If 
the subjects are risk-neutral profit-maximizers, then for each treatment, the predicted aggregate 
expected penalties are   from [6]. That is,   is minimum aggregate expected 
penalties given predicted aggregate emissions  .   
( )
p PV ( )
p PV
p V
  The means of observed expected penalties for each treatment, denoted  , are calculated 
as follows. For each individual in each round of the experiments, we calculated the penalty that 
she would incur if audited for her actual level of violations; this was then multiplied by the audit 
probability to get her expected penalty. These values were then summed over the individuals in a 
group in each round to obtain aggregate expected penalties for each group in each round. In 
Table 4 we present the means of these values (averaged over groups and rounds) for each 
treatment.  Note that these are the averages of aggregate expected penalties, not the means of the 
penalties that were actually imposed as a result of the random audits.  This is the appropriate 
a P
  21metric as we are interested in the choices that were made given the ex ante expected penalties, 
not the ex post realizations. Obviously these values are equal to zero in the Perfect Enforcement 
treatments. It is also important to recall that differences between   and   do not indicate 
permit market failures; they are due instead to differences in compliance choices from those of 
risk-neutral, profit-maximizing agents. Finally, to calculate the allocation and compliance effects 
of the differences between observed and predicted expected penalties, we calculated the 
minimum possible aggregate expected penalty given the observed aggregate violations for each 
group, round, and treatment. In Table 4 we report the means of these values for each treatment, 
. <INSERT TABLE 4> 




Note that mean observed expected penalties are significantly lower than predicted for the 
three Imperfect Enforcement/ Low Standard treatments. In contrast, mean expected penalties are 
higher that predicted for the Imperfect Enforcement/ High Standard treatments, but the 
differences are statistically significant in only two of six cases. Note, however, that the 
allocations effects are always positive and significant (although weakly significant in one case). 
This indicates that, given the observed levels of aggregate violations, individual violations were 
not distributed in the way that would minimize aggregate expected penalties. The compliance 
effects are negative and significant for the Imperfect Enforcement/ Low Standard treatments 
while they are not different from zero in the Imperfect Enforcement/ High Standard treatments. 
These simply reflect that facts that the subjects chose significantly lower-than-predicted 
violations in the Imperfect Enforcement/ Low Standard treatments, while aggregate violations 
were very close to predicted values under the Imperfect Enforcement/ High Standard treatments. 
 
  224.4 The compliance and allocation effects of deviations from predicted expected net profits 
In this final section, we pull together our results about deviations in aggregate gross profits and 
expected penalties from predicted values to answer the basic question of how well the groups in 
our experiments performed relative to predictions. That is, we examine deviations in aggregate 
expected net profits (gross profits minus expected penalties) from predictions.  
  In Table 5 we first present predicted net profits,  . Recall that 
is maximized expected net profit: the predicted levels of aggregate emissions and 
resulting aggregate violations, as well as the levels of individual emissions and violations, 
maximize the expected aggregate payoff to the industry. We also present mean observed 
expected net profits,  , and mean maximized expected net profits at the observed 
levels of aggregate emissions,  . Note that the differences between 
predicted and mean observed expected net profits,  , is negative and significant for 
each treatment. However, they are very close to their maximized values. In percentage terms, 
observed expected net profits are very nearly 100% of maxima for the Perfect Compliance 
Treatments; they exceed 95.8% of maxima for each of the Imperfect Enforcement/ High 
Standard treatments; they are somewhat lower for the Imperfect Enforcement/ Low Standard 
treatments, ranging from 87% to 96% of maximized expected net profits.  
( ) ( ) ( )








aa WB P =−
( ) ( ) ( )
aa WQ BQ PV =−
( )
a WW Q −
  Mean observed expected net profits deviate from maximized values by greater amounts 
(in percentage terms) under the Imperfect Enforcement/ Low Standard treatments because of the 
significant compliance effects in these treatments. Although the allocation effects for all 
Imperfect Enforcement treatments are significant, they are similar in magnitudes across the Low 
Standard and High Standard treatments. However, the compliance effects in the Imperfect 
Enforcement/ Low Standard treatments are large and significant, while they are very small and 
  23insignificant in the Imperfect Enforcement/ High Standard treatments. The groups under the 
Imperfect Enforcement/ Low Standard treatments tended to do worse mainly because they chose 
significantly lower-than-predicted violations.  
  
5. Conclusion 
The most important results of our work are that experimental emissions permit markets are 
highly efficient at allocating individual emissions control, despite imperfect enforcement and 
significant violations, but aggregate violations may not be as high as one would predict with a 
standard model of behavior, particularly when the model predicts high levels of noncompliance. 
In treatments in which subjects did not violate their permits as much as predicted, mean 
aggregate expected payoffs were lower than maximized expected payoffs. It is important to 
reiterate that this finding does not imply some sort of inefficiency. Rather it appears to be due 
mainly to violation choices that differ from those that a risk-neutral payoff-maximizing 
individual would make. If there is a failure, it is a failure of the standard model to accurately 
predict compliance choices, not a failure of permit markets to allocate emissions efficiently.  
  In fact, lower-than-predicted violation choices can mean higher social welfare. We have 
focused our analysis on the welfare of firms operating under imperfectly enforced emissions 
trading, but presumably there are damages from their emissions. We have not said anything 
about pollution damage, because including it in our analysis can only be done in an ad hoc 
manner. Nevertheless, when violations are lower-than-predicted, pollution damage is lower-than-
predicted. It is easy to come up with specifications of damage functions for our experiments with 
which the lower-than-predicted violations we observe lead to higher-than-predicted social 
welfare.  
  24  One should be careful about this possibility. It does not mean that imperfect enforcement 
of emissions trading programs is somehow desirable; it only means that imperfect enforcement 
may in some situations be less costly than standard models would predict.  Recent theoretical 
developments suggest that it is likely to be efficient to design tradable rights programs that 
achieve perfect compliance (Stranlund 2007). Moreover, several current emissions trading 
schemes have achieved perfect, or at least near perfect, compliance (e.g. the EPA’s SO2 and NOX 
Budget trading programs). Our analysis does not address these situations. Instead, our analysis is 
motivated by the fact that implementing emissions trading policies beyond their current 
applications will often mean moving them into contexts in which inducing and maintaining 
perfect compliance will be more difficult. With the continuing application of market-based 
policies into new regulatory settings, it is virtually certain that regulators will have to confront 
the problems associated with imperfect enforcement, if they have not had to do so already. Our 
analysis provides valuable information about the likely welfare effects of failing to induce 
perfect compliance with tradable property rights regulations. 
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Table 1. Experimental Design 
Enforcement   Aggregate Standard / Initial Allocation 
 
Perfect Enforcement Treatments 
(none)     Low Standard/ Uniform 
High Standard/ Uniform 
 
Imperfect Enforcement Treatments 
Medium(πH)     Low Standard /Uniform 
High Standard/ Uniform 
High Standard / Non-uniform 
 
Medium(πL)     Low Standard / Uniform 
High Standard / Uniform 
High Standard /Non-uniform 
 
Low     Low Standard / Uniform 
High Standard Uniform 
   High Standard / Non-uniform 
Each treatment was repeated three times with eight participants per group. 
 
  27Table 2. Predicted and Actual Aggregate Emissions and Violations 
 
Treatment 
p Q  
a Q   p V  
a V  
ap VV −  
Low Standard   
Perfect Enforcement  28 28 0     
Medium (πH)  52 48.4 24 20.4  –3.6
***
Medium (πL)  52 40.4 24 12.4 –11.6
***
Low  64 55.7 36 27.7  –8.3
***
        
High Standard Uniform Allocation 
Perfect Enforcement  56 56 0     
Medium (πH)  64 63.5 8  7.5  –  0.5 
Medium (πL)  64 65.4 8  8.9  0.9 
Low  76 76.3 20 20.3  0.3 
         
High Standard Non–uniform Allocation 
Perfect Enforcement        
Medium (πH)
  64 63.9 8  7.9  –  0.1 
Medium (πL)  64 65.4 8  9.4  1.4 
Low  76 74.5 20 18.5  –1.5 
Significance levels 
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01, are for tests of 
the null hypothesis that the value is equal to zero.  Wald 
2 χ tests are 
obtained from a linear regression of 
a VV
p − with dummy variables for 
each treatment as the fixed effects and allowing for random effects 
across groups and periods. 
 
  28Table 3. The Compliance and Allocation Effects of Deviations from Predicted Gross Profits 
 
Treatment  ()
p B Q  
a B Q   ()
a B Q   ()
ap B BQ −   ()




aa B BQ −  
Percent Allocation 
Efficiency 




ap B QB Q −
 
Low Standard 
Perfect Enforcement  420               
         
         
         
        
           
             
             
             
          
           
             
           
417.1 420 –2.9 99.3% –2.9 99.3% 0














     
High Standard Uniform Allocation 
Perfect Enforcement  708 706.6 708 –1.4
* 99.8% –1.4
* 99.8% 0
Medium (πH)   768 758.3 763.6 –9.7 98.7% –5.3
** 99.3% –4.4
Medium (πL)     768 766.9 772.7 –1.1 99.9% –5.8
** 99.3% 4.7




   
High Standard Non–uniform Allocation 
Medium (πH)  
  768 751.0 766.0 –17.0
** 97.8% –15.0
*** 98.1% –2.0
Medium (πL)     768 768.4 776.1 0.4 100.0% –7.7
*** 99.0% 8.1





*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01, are for tests of the null hypothesis that the value is equal to zero.  
Wald 
2 χ tests are obtained from linear regressions of each variable with dummies for each treatment as the fixed effects for 
treatment and allowing for random effects across group and period.  
  29Table 4. The Compliance and Allocation Effects of Deviations from Predicted Expected Penalties 
 
Treatment  ()
p PV   a P   ()
a PV   ()









ap PV PV −
             
           
            




            
            
           
     
     
 
       
       
Low Standard 
 
Perfect Enforcement  0 0 0
Medium (πH)  148.9 129.0 123.2 –  19.9
*** 86.6%  5.8
*** – 25.7
***
Medium (πL)  149.5 81.1 70.4 –  68.4
*** 54.3%  10.8
** – 79.4
***
Low  126.7 94.9 83.9 –  31.8




High Standard Uniform Allocation 
 
Perfect Enforcement  0 0 0
Medium (πH)  41.6 45.1 40.2 3.5 108.5% 5.0
* – 1.4 
Medium (πL)  41.7 55.5 48.1 13.8 133.0% 7.4
** 6.4 
Low  50.5 71.4 51.9 20.9
** 141.3%  19.6
*** 1.3 
     
High Standard Non-uniform Allocation 
     
Medium (πH)
  41.6  48.0 41.9 6.4  115.3%  6.1
** 0.4 
Medium (πL)  41.7  68.3 51.1 26.5
** 163.6%  17.1
*** 9.4 
Low  50.5  62.8 45.5 12.2  124.2%  17.3
** – 5.1 
 
Significance levels 
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01, are for tests of the null hypothesis that the value is 
equal to zero.  Wald 
2 χ tests are obtained from a linear regression with dummy variables for each treatment as 
the fixed effects and allowing for random effects across groups and periods. Table 5. The Compliance and Allocation Effects of Deviations from Predicted Expected Net Profits 
 
Treatment  ()
p WQ   a W   ()
a WQ ()
ap WW Q − ()








ap WQ WQ −
             
            
            
     
     
     
     
            
            
     
     
     
     
      
      
     
     
     
Low Standard 
 
Perfect Enforcement  420 417.1 420 –  2.9
* 99.3%  – 2.9
* 0 
Medium (πH)  527.2 505.1 519.2 –  22.0
*** 95.8%  – 14.1
*** – 7.9
***
Medium (πL)  526.5 461.3 490.6 –  65.1
*** 87.6%  – 29.2
*** – 35.9
***
Low  641.3 597.8 621.4 –  43.5




High Standard Uniform Allocation 
 
Perfect Enforcement  708 706.6 708 –  1.4
*** 99.8%  – 1.4
** 0 
Medium (πH)  726.4 713.2 723.5 –  13.2
*** 98.2%  – 10.3
** – 2.9 
Medium (πL)  726.3 711.4 724.6 –  14.9
*** 98.0%  – 13.2
*** – 1.7 
Low  785.5 752.4
 
784.3 –  33.1
*** 95.8%  – 32.0
*** – 1.2 
     
High Standard Non-uniform Allocation 
       
Medium (πH)
  726.4 703.0 724.1 –  23.4
*** 96.8%  – 21.1
*** – 2.3 
Medium (πL)  726.3 700.2 725.0 –  26.1
*** 96.4%  – 24.8
*** – 1.3 
Low  785.5 754.1 782.1 –  31.3
*** 96.0%  – 27.9
*** – 3.4 
 
Significance levels 
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01, are for tests of the null hypothesis that the value is 
equal to zero.  Wald 
2 χ tests are obtained from a linear regression with dummy variables for each treatment as 
the fixed effects and allowing for random effects across groups and periods. 
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